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SHINING LIGHT ON HIDDEN PREFERENCES: THE ROLE OF
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE 1989 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION

By Justin Clardie
Justin Clardie is an associate professor of international relations at Northwest Nazarene
University. His research focuses broadly on transitions of government, with a special emphasis
on dissent and social movements in former Communist Europe. His work has been published in
Armed Forces and Society and Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe.
"A spectre is haunting Eastern Europe: the spectre of what in the West is called 'dissent.'"
This is how Vaclav Havel, the Czech playwright, dissident, and President, began his influential
1978 essay, "The Power of the Powerless." Havel's statement of dissent in Eastern Europe was
certainly true in his country of Czechoslovakia, as well as in countries such as Poland and
Hungary. The presence of sustained and organized dissent was largely absent, however, in
Romania. Even in countries with the presence of popular and consistent dissent, the collapse of
the communist regime was still shocking in both scope and speed. As Gaddis suggests, the
failure to conceive of and subsequent shock of the collapse of communism was true in academics
as well as in government and the media.1 The unexpected collapse of communism in countries
such as Poland and Czechoslovakia with dissident movements as prominent as Solidarity and
Charter 77 makes the collapse of the Ceausescu regime even more shocking. Small protests in
Timisoara, on December 15, 1989, ultimately culminated with the execution of Ceausescu and
his wife on December 25 that year. The speed and beginnings of the collapse of Romanian
Communism are still puzzling to this day.
John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17
(1992/93): 5-6.
1
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This paper attempts to address this puzzle by examining the role religion and religious
institutions played in the sudden collapse of Ceausescu. The argument builds off the work of
Timur Kuran and suggests that, under certain conditions, when religious leaders or institutions
publicly speak out against the government, this encourages others, who may have otherwise been
reluctant, to express their true preferences as well. The effects are primarily due to two
characteristics associated with religion and religious groups. Religious groups are often excellent
at building strong internal bonds resulting in cohesive groups capable of collective action.
Furthermore, in many societies, religious leaders and groups command a great deal of respect
and trust. Their actions are not the same as other potential actors in the society and their
expressed opposition to the government and its policies may have more influence. These two
factors are magnified in situations when the religious group has ties to other religious groups
outside of the country because this potentially brings in new actors to the domestic context. The
government, opposition groups and private citizens are forced to consider the actions of these
international players in decisions related to dissent. The effects are also strengthened if the
religious group has strong ties to other groups in society.
The argument presented here is not that religion or religious institutions are the primary
factors in revolutions in general or in 1989 Romania specifically. There are obviously structural,
historical, economic, cultural, and unique individual factors that are at play in every revolution.
The influence of religion, however, is often underappreciated. This paper attempts to integrate
the influence of religion into an existing theory of sudden revolution and collective action, which
hopefully contributes to existing literature by providing a systematic explanation of religion's
influence in such situations. The next section of the paper briefly examines some of the existing
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literature on the role of religion in social movements and collective action. The theory is more
fully explicated in the following section and is then applied to the case of 1989 Romania.

Religion, Social Capital and Collective Action
There is an extensive literature detailing causes and theoretical approaches to
revolutionary and social movements. This literature is not of immediate concern for the current
study, and as such, the focus here will be on the influence of religion in revolutionary and social
movements. The bulk of research with respect to religion in social movements focuses on the
potential role of religion in facilitating and building social capital.
The basic link between religion and social movements identified in the literature is that
religion can increase levels of social capital and that social capital can increase the likelihood of
social movements. Social movements benefit from high levels of trust and cohesive social
networks, which are elements of social capital. So, to the extent that religion does influence
social capital in a positive manner, it can indirectly influence the emergence of social
movements.
Religious affiliation and/or beliefs are related to higher levels of trust, as demonstrated in
a diverse group of studies. The main thrust of these studies is that individuals associated with
religion in some fashion exhibit higher levels of trust in general than individuals who identified
more as non-religious. This is true in a number of different contexts, such as modern-day
Canada2 (Matta 2013), the United States3 and Germany.4 Religion has also been argued to

2

Mayram Dilmaghani, "Religiosity and Social Trust: Evidence from Canada," Review of Social Economy (2016): 127.
3
Michael R. Welch, David Sikkink and Matthew T. Loveland, “The Radius of Trust: Religion, Social
Embeddedness and Trust in Strangers,” Social Forces 86 (2007): 23-46; Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell,
American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
4
Richard Traunmuller, “Moral Communities? Religion as a Source of Social Trust in a Multilevel Analysis of 97
German Regions,” European Sociological Review 27 (2010): 346-363.
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increase trust in specific economic contexts, like Jewish diamond merchants5 and Muslim traders
in Northern Africa.6 The influence of religion on strengthening social networks and building
community has also been identified in the literature, within multiple different contexts.7
The basic argument presented for the influence of religion on both trust and social
cohesion is two-fold. First, religious involvement results in increased interactions, which leads to
both increased trust and stronger social networks.8 With respect to trust, this argument mirrors
similar suggestions in the rational choice literature—specifically, as it relates to the concept of
trust and the classic prisoner's dilemma game.9 Religious involvement often results in the
repeated interaction that is necessary to overcome the lack of trust inherent in the game. The
second basic argument suggests that religion creates signals and rituals that help to bind
communities together and in the process, create stronger levels of trust. This line of thought is
classically represented by Durkheim and Weber, but also has found traction in current research
in this area.10
Finally, there are many studies that argue religion helps play a role in solving collective
action problems and lead to greater likelihood of social movements, political action and civic
5

James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1990); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling
Alone: The Collapse and the Revival of American Democracy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
6
Jean Ensminger, “Transaction Costs and Islam: Explaining Conversion in Africa,” Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics (1997): 4-29.
7
Alan Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights (Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2004); Putnam, Bowling Alone; Putnam and Campbell, American Grace; Hans Schmeets and Saskia
te Riele, “Declining Social Cohesion in the Netherlands?” Social Indicators Research 115 (2014): 791-812; Kenneth
D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States 7th ed. (Rowman and Littlefield,
2014); Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen and Samuel S. Hill, “Churches as Political Communities,” American
Political Science Review 82 (1988): 531-548.
8
Putnam and Campbell, American Grace; Richard Sosis, “Does Religion Promote Trust? The Role of Signaling,
Reputation, and Punishment,” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 1 (2005): 2-30; Wald and CalhounBrown, Religion and Politics in the United States; Wald, Owen and Hill, “Churches as Political Communities.”
9
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
10
Karel Dobbelaere, “Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of
Secularization,” Sociology of Religion 60 (1999): 229-247; Richard Sosis, “Religion and Intragroup Cooperation:
Preliminary Results of a Comparative Analysis of Utopian Communities,” Cross-Cultural Research 34 (2000): 7087; Richard Sosis, “The Adaptive Value of Religious Ritual,” American Scientist 92 (2004): 166-172; Rodney Stark,
“Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40 (2001): 619-636.
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competence. Wald and his co-authors present the most comprehensive model of this within the
context of the United States. They suggest that religion should be considered as a political
resource that impacts three key aspects needed for collective action: motivation, organization,
and social interaction.11 Numerous studies operating within this general framework have looked
at religious involvement in social movements, like human rights12 and civil rights in the AfricanAmerican community.13 Religious affiliation and/or religious belief have also been found to
result in greater social cohesion14 and adolescent civic competence15 in the Netherlands as well
as civic engagement and participation in the U.S. and Canada.16

Kuran’s Model of Preference Falsification
The challenge of the current study is to integrate the influences associated with religion
described above into existing theoretical work on revolutions, specifically, the theory
emphasizing the importance of preference falsification developed by Timur Kuran.17 Kuran
seeks to explain why so many revolutions surprise us by their sudden emergence, while in
11

Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States.
Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children.
13
R. Khari Brown and Ronald E. Brown, “Faith and Works: Church-based Social Capital Resources and African
American Political Activism,” Social Forces 82 (2003): 617-641; Frederick C. Harris, “Something Within: Religion
as a Mobilizer of African-American Political Activism,” Journal of Politics 56 (1994): 42-68.
14
Schmeets and te Riele, “Declining Social Cohesion in the Netherlands?”
15
Malin Grundel and Mieke Maliepaard, “Knowing, Understanding and Practicing Democratic Citizenship: an
Investigation of the Role of Religion Among Muslim, Christian and Non-religious Adolescents,” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 35 (2012): 2075-2096.
16
Robyn Driskell, Elizabeth Embry and Larry Lyon, “Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on
Political Participation,” Social Sciences Quarterly 89 (2008): 294-314; Robyn Driskell, Larry Lyon and Elizabeth
Embry, “Civic Engagement and Religious Activities: Examining the Influence of Religious Tradition and
Participation,” Sociological Spectrum 28 (2008): 578-601; Chao Guo et al, “Religious Affiliation, Religious
Attendance, and Participation in Social Change Organizations,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42
(2013): 34-58; Putnam and Campbell, American Grace; Eric M. Uslaner, “Religion and Civic Engagement in
Canada and the United States,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41 (2002): 239-254.
17
Timur Kuran, “Chameleon Voters and Public Choice,” Public Choice 53 (1987): 53-78; Timur Kuran,
“Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism,” The Economic Journal 97 (1987): 642665; Timur Kuran, “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution,” Public Choice 61
(1989): pp. 41-74; Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of
1989,” World Politics 44 (1991): 7-48; Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of
Preference Falsification (Harvard University Press, 1997).
12
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hindsight they seem obvious. The explanation he arrives at builds on a model developed in
previous work to explain why policies with little private support may be enacted and why they
are difficult to overturn.18 Revolutions are often so surprising because there are incentives for
individuals to keep their true preferences hidden. Large numbers of people may actually oppose
the existing government and favor another option, but these private preferences are not made
public.19 This is what Kuran refers to as preference falsification.
Preference falsification is influenced by two factors, which are generally unique to each
individual: an integrity function and a reputation function. The integrity function relates to how
much stress is created for the individual by “lying” about their true preference. If the integrity
function is high enough, the individual cannot live with the preference falsification and their
private and public preferences will be the same.20 Whereas the integrity function is based on
individual psychological factors, the reputation function is influenced by external factors. In
other words, the integrity function is influenced by internal payoffs and the reputation function
influenced by external payoffs.21 There are costs associated with making the private preference
public, such as social shaming, loss of employment or even physical harm. There is also
uncertainty because of the difficulty associated with determining the true preference of others.
Thus the perceived costs and the uncertainty create incentives to keep the true preference
private.22
The integrity and reputation functions jointly influence an individual’s threshold level.
The threshold level is essentially the percentage of public preferences in society necessary for the
individual to express their private preference in public. The individual sees there are people who
Kuran, “Chameleon Voters and Public Choice”; Kuran, “Preference Falsification…”
Kuran, “Sparks and Prairie Fires”; Kuran, “Now out of Never”; Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
18
19
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think like he or she does, which results in lower reputation costs. If a person has a high integrity
function, meaning a great deal of psychological distress due to preference falsification, it will
require only a small percentage of other people publicly expressing the same preference. If a
person has a low integrity function, he or she will require a greater percentage of the population
expressing the same preference.23
The suddenness of the revolution results from a revolutionary bandwagon, which is
usually caused by some change that lowers reputation costs. The decrease in reputation costs
then allows some individuals to express their private preferences publicly. This in turn creates a
greater percentage of people openly expressing opposition to the government, which in turn
meets the threshold level for further individuals who then express their preferences publicly and
so on.24 Because we cannot know for certain the true nature of private preferences in the society,
we are shocked by such a sudden display of opposition to the existing government.
Kuran notes that this phenomenon is also expressed eloquently in Vaclav Havel’s essay
“The Power of the Powerless.” In the essay, Havel describes a greengrocer who places a sign,
which reads “Workers of the World Unite” in the window of his shop. The sign is not placed in
the window because the greengrocer believes the slogan but it is placed in the window to avoid
the costs of nonconformity, like losing his job. If one day the greengrocer decided to remove the
sign, this could create ripples throughout the whole society and threaten the control of the
government. Throughout the essay, Havel repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the social lie
(in Kuran’s terminology preference falsification) to keep the government in power and the
importance of truth in threating the system.

23
24

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Three factors influence the prospects of revolution occurring. The first factor is an
increase in the expected share of support for the opposition to the government, which can be
caused in increased exposure of private preferences. The second factor is a widespread lowering
of the threshold level, which leads to a greater number of individuals expressing their private
preferences resulting in the revolutionary bandwagon. This can be caused by the opposition’s
increased ability to minimize the reputational costs to expressing private preferences. The last
factor is an increase in the number of individuals who have private preferences against the
government.25An additional factor that Kuran highlights is the role of leadership. The model is
built on the preferences and behavior of non-activists but leaders can have tremendous influence.
A leader can raise public awareness of discontent and create a jump in the perceived share of
support for the opposition. A leader can also help minimize the reputation costs associated with
expressing private preferences and shape private preferences.26

Religion and Preference Falsification
The argument presented here is that religion can influence the likelihood of revolution by
decreasing reputation costs associated with expressing private preferences and thus lowering the
threshold level. Religion has much of the same impact that Kuran ascribes to leaders. The
influence of religion is also very much related to its positive relationship with levels of social
capital. The trust within religious communities and trust across society for religious leaders
creates a unique ability to raise public awareness of discontent and cause an increase in the
expected share of opposition support. Moreover, the trust and increased interaction within the
community lower reputation costs to expressing private preferences. This has the added bonus of

25
26

Ibid.
Ibid.
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increasing the expected share of opposition support as well. The combination of these factors
decreases the threshold level, making revolution more likely. Each of these will be discussed in
more detail.
The review of literature above demonstrates that religious affiliation and belief is often
associated with higher levels of trust in general. This relates only to those who are religiously
inclined. Does religion increase trust for those not associated with religion and for society? A
number of studies suggest that this is the case,27even when specific groups are identified through
religious symbols.28 If greater trust is placed in religious people, regardless of association with a
specific religious group, then we could expect that religious people, and especially leaders, will
be able to increase the expected share of opposition support. The individual is afraid to express
their private preference because they do not know how many others feel the same way they do.
The fear creates uncertainty and general lack of trust. The individual is likely to be more inclined
to believe a religious leader who raises awareness of public discontent than they might an
intellectual or a worker. One argument for why greater trust is placed in religious people is the
assumption that their religious beliefs restrain their selfish behavior.29 A group of workers may
express opposition to specific government policies that adversely impact them but not society as
a whole. Our individual who is afraid to express his or her private preferences may not be
convinced that such an expression of opposition is truly widespread and moves beyond the
specific interests of the group of workers. The greater trust placed in religious people and leaders
create more certainty that others hold the same beliefs as the individual does. One of the most
successful workers’ movements was Solidarity in Poland, but even Lech Walesa acknowledged
Michael E. McCullough et. al, “Christian Religious Badges Instill Trust in Christian and Non-Christian
Perceivers,” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 8 (2016): 149-163; Putnam and Campbell, American Grace.
28
McCullough et. al, “Christian Religious Badges…”
29
Ibid.; Jeffrey P. Schloss and Michael J. Murray, “Evolutionary Accounts of Belief in Supernatural Punishment: a
Critical Review," Religion, Brain & Behavior 1 (2011): 46-99.
27
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the importance of the support given to it by the Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II in his
Nobel lecture and his memoirs.
The greater social cohesion often found in religious communities is of extra importance
in societies that lack high levels of social capital, which is often the case in authoritarian or
totalitarian societies before revolution. Normal social interactions through organizations outside
the influence of the government are rare. The interaction that occurs within the religious
community results in higher levels of social cohesion than in most other groups in society. This
allows for greater mobilization and collective action within the community by lowering
reputation costs and allowing communication and interaction through established social
networks. Our individual may still be uncertain and lack trust in other members of society but
because of the trust and social interaction within their religious community, they are more certain
they share their private preference in opposition to the government. The larger the religious
community, the more influence it has on lowering reputation costs as an individual is safer from
possible negative consequences if shielded by a large group of people. The religious community
does not have to be large or have connections with others in society to trigger a revolutionary
bandwagon however. The challenge identified by Kuran is to get people to express their private
preferences given the costs they face. If the reputation costs are lowered by qualities associated
with the religious community and the private preferences of the individuals are expressed, this
has the result of lowering reputation costs for individuals throughout society. It is possible then
that this lowers threshold levels and leads to the revolutionary bandwagon— even if it is only a
small group of individuals that is largely disconnected from society.
To summarize, the higher levels of social capital associated with religion allow religious
people and leaders to increase the expected share of opposition support and lower reputation
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costs. Both factors are magnified under two possible conditions. The first is if the religious group
is connected to similar religious groups outside the country. This can have the effect of
dramatically decreasing reputation costs by bringing large groups of people outside the country
in to the consideration of expressing private preferences. Our individual may feel safer in
expressing private preferences if they believe that not only other people in their country feel as
they do, but that they also have the support and cover of people and institutions outside the
country. The government is also less likely to aggressively repress dissent if they may face
higher costs from outside groups. The role of the Catholic Church in movements in Latin
America and Poland30 and the Lutheran Church in East Germany and Latvia31 illustrate this
principle. Secondly, the likelihood of collective action leading to revolutionary bandwagons is
greater if the religious community has extensive ties to other groups in society. The benefits
expressed above of social interaction and networks within the religious community are greater if
they incorporate other groups as well. Putnam32 discusses this in the context of his concepts of
bonding and bridging capital and has been argued to be a factor in countries such as Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.33

Daniela Angi, “Three Instances of Church and Anti-Communist Opposition: Hungary, Poland and Romania,”
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 10 (2011): 21-64; Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late 20th Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan,
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist
Europe (Johns Hopkins Press, 1996).
31
Justin Clardie, “Communist Legacies and Opposition Churches: Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe,” Religion
and Society in Central and Eastern Europe 9 (2016): 17-35; Paul Froese and Steven Pfaff, “Replete and Desolate
Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the New Religious Paradigm,” Social Forces 80 (2001): 481-507; Robert F.
Goeckel, “The Baltic Churches and the Democratization Process,” in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New
States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1995): 202-226; Marie Sapiets, “’Rebirth and
Renewal’ in the Latvian Lutheran Church,” Religion, State and Society: The Keston Journal 16 (1988):.237-249.
32
Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Puntam, Bowling Alone.
33
Angi, “Three Instances…”; Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague (New York: Vintage Books, 1999); Maryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition:
Linking Organizations Through Activists in The Polish People’s Republic,” in Social Movements and Networks, eds.
Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 77-104.
30
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Religion, Romania, and Revolutionary Bandwagons
Timothy Garton Ash reports that he commented to Vaclav Havel, “In Poland it took ten
years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will
take ten days.”34As it turned out, it took just over a month in Czechoslovakia, but in Romania it
did take only ten days. Protests began in Timisoara on December 15, Nicolae and Elena
Ceausescu fled on December 22 and were executed on December 25. The removal of Ceausescu
was shocking in and of itself, but the way it began and the speed in which it spread made it even
more surprising. The spark that immediately precipitated the downfall of the regime was the
attempt to evict a Hungarian Reformed pastor, Laszlo Tökes, and his family from his apartment
in Timisoara. That the revolution began with events surrounding Tökes, a minority in both
nationality and religion is noteworthy. The case of Romania appears a good case to explore the
theory presented above. Kuran applies his model to other anti-communist movements in 1989
but devotes little attention to Romania. The level of repression and lack of dissent seem to make
Kuran’s model a relevant one for analysis. The fact that the original protests centered on a
religious leader makes it a good case to explore the characteristics of religious influence
described above.
The structural conditions in Romania in 1989 were certainly conducive to some type of
anti-regime movement. Ceausescu’s rule was as brutal as that of any other Communist leader in
Eastern Europe. Extreme austerity measures, which rationed everything from cooking oil to
electricity, began in the early 1980s. Elevators were avoided at night for fear of being stuck in
one overnight if the electricity was shut off when you happened to be inside. Heating for
apartment buildings was rationed resulting in brutal conditions for residents during the Romanian
winter. Even something as simple as sharing your cooking oil with others could result in an
34

Ash, The Magic Lantern, 78.
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encounter with the Securitate, Romania’s secret police. The austerity measures were put in place
to facilitate an aggressive campaign to pay off all of Romania’s foreign debt, a policy in line with
Ceausescu’s general foreign policy of isolation.35 Against the backdrop of such harsh conditions
for the people, Ceausescu implemented his program of “systematization,” which was an
ambitious urban planning effort that certainly increased resentment and frustration in the
population. One later aspect of this program was an attempt at urban renewal within cities, the
best example being the construction of the “House of the Republic” in the heart of Bucharest.
The building would eventually become the second largest administrative building in the world
and require that entire blocks of the Romanian capital be destroyed to make room for
Ceausescu’s building.36 Such opulence and grandeur directed by Ceausescu, within the setting of
suffering and poverty largely created by Ceausescu’s policy, would certainly increase opposition
to his government. The larger aspect of the program was the effort to industrialize the rural
countryside by creating industrial centers throughout Romania. This required the elimination of
hundreds of small villages throughout the country and relocation of their inhabitants to a more
urban setting.37 Again, it is not hard to imagine that such a program could fuel increased
opposition.
The international structure also seemed to be ripe for revolution. The Soviet Union was
weakening and increasingly turning inward to resolve its own weaknesses. Perhaps most
influentially, the other Communist states in Eastern Europe were collapsing in the fall of 1989,
even Bulgaria, which was further from Western Europe than the others and closer to Romania in
demographics. The domino effect of revolutions, like what happened in Europe in 1848 or what
35

Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New York: Modern
Library, 2010); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: Free
Press, 1992).
36
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics.
37
Ibid.; Laszlo Tokes, The Fall of Tyrants (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1990).
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would happen in Northern Africa and Southwest Asia in 2011, made it likely that eventually
Romania would be impacted. In hindsight, then, it is easy to look back at Romania toward the
end of 1989 and suggest that given the domestic and international conditions, it was headed
toward regime change. However, the bulk of evidence from that time lead to a different
conclusion. Internally, although there was some dissent such as the “Letter of the Six” by six
prominent members of the Communist Party, Ceausescu was still re-elected to his post of
General Secretary unanimously in November of 1989.38 In December of 1989, the Christian
Science Monitor reported that Ceausescu’s hold on power seemed firm39 and Ceausescu himself
felt confident enough to leave the country for a few days in the middle of the uprising.40
Romania was also in a position to be less influenced by external factors because of its reliance on
a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union.41 The structural conditions lent themselves to
the likelihood of an uprising but such an event was by no means certain.

Religious Leaders and Trust
We can turn now to the examination of the events of December 1989 in Romania in light
of the theory described above. The first component of religious influence is also the most
difficult to ascertain. As presented above, there is general evidence that people from across
society have high levels of trust in religious leaders and people but such evidence is difficult to
come by in the case under examination. To determine how much trust individuals placed in
religious leaders during the time in question in Romania, we are forced to look for indirect
Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of
December 1989,” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (2000): 1069-1093.
39
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics.
40
Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The 1989 Revolution and Romania’s Future,” Problems of
Communism 40 (1991): 42-59; Kotkin, Uncivil Society.
41
Hall, “Theories of Collective Action…”; Cristina Petrescu, “Romania,” in Dissent and Opposition in Communist
Eastern Europe, eds. Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 141-160.
38
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evidence of such trust. One potential source is to look at public opinion data as close to the
events of 1989 as possible. Unfortunately, one of the only sources for such data is the European
Values Study survey of 1993. In that survey, 72.4 percent of respondents claimed to have a great
deal or quite a lot of confidence in church institutions. In comparison, only 29.9 percent
expressed such confidence in trade unions, 20.8 percent in parliament, and 45.1 percent in the
police.42 Public opinion data three years following the event and at the aggregate level may not
directly relate to the case under examination but it does paint a society that generally places
greater trust in religious institutions and leaders than in other societal institutions.
The other aspect that may require some consideration is the concept of increasing
perceived share of opposition support. Tökes is noteworthy in his consistent efforts speaking
against the systematization program of Ceausescu. He was rewarded by repeated harassments
from the Securitate and relocation to different posts within the Hungarian Reformed Church.43
The beginning of his eviction from Timisoara began months earlier in March and was appealed
through formal channels in the Hungarian Reformed Church hierarchy.44 Although Tökes was
forced to move several times before 1989 due to his open criticisms of Ceausescu’s policy, the
actions intensified following the airing of an interview Tökes conducted on Hungarian
television.45 Tökes’ telephone line was cut, he was refused ration books and in November, the
windows in his apartment were broken and he was stabbed.46 The efforts taken by the Securitate,
local officials and the church clearly indicate they saw Tökes, his message, and his influence as a
threat. He openly criticized Ceausescu and did so outside of the country, allowing him to reach a
42
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larger audience and thus had a dedicated group of followers in Timisoara. His supporters viewed
him as one of the few people who had the courage to tell the truth and stand up to the unjust
actions of Ceausescu.47 These factors could certainly result in others watching these events
believing that there were more people who opposed the regime than imagined.

Religious Leaders, Reputation Costs and Mobilization
The second factor of the theory, that religion can help lower reputation costs through
stronger community and mobilization, is more clearly evident in the Romanian case. Romania
stood apart from its Eastern European counterparts in terms of lack of organized dissent. As
reported by Linz and Stepan, only two independent movements existed in Romania in June of
1989. This compared to 60 in Poland, 13 in Bulgaria and nine in East Germany.48 Romania did
not experience high profile movements either, such as Solidarity in Poland or Charter 77 in
Czechoslovakia. The samizdat publications that appeared in other countries were largely absent
from Romania. Ceausescu had implemented an effective program targeting and isolating dissent,
creating a society without much interaction between groups and lacking in trust.49 So thorough
were the efforts to silence dissent that “typewriters had to be registered with the police…and
failure to report a conversation with a foreigner was a criminal offense.”50 There are a few
notable intellectuals, like Paul Goma and Doina Cornea, that spoke out against the government
but their efforts failed to spark widespread movements. Cornea wrote multiple letters that were
broadcast on Radio Free Europe. As a result, she was relieved of her position as a professor,
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spent time in jail, was subjected to 24-hour surveillance and vilified in the Romanian press.51
The costs were dramatic and served as a deterrent to others who might potentially act. Cornea’s
Securitate file indicates reports against her from former students and colleagues at the university
she worked.52
The other prominent source of dissent in Romania came from periodic workers’ strikes.
The two most notable occasions were the Jiu Valley miners’ strike in August 1977 and the Red
Flag truck plant workers’ protest in Brasov in November 1987. The Jiu Valley miners’ strike
remained a principally work-related protest and was resolved within three days through
negotiations between the workers and eventually Ceausescu himself.53 Although the strike was
resolved peacefully, approximately 4,000 miners were forced to relocate to other parts of the
country and were put under state surveillance.54 The protest of the workers at the Red Flag plant
was more complex. Although it began with grievances about non-payment of wages, it spread
quickly into an anti-Ceausescu protest concerned about lack of heating and food.55 Also unlike
the Jiu Valley strike, the protest in Brasov was met with more force by the government and
resulted in a number of arrests. Sixty-one people were convicted and received sentences of
forced labor and dozens more were interrogated, harassed and placed under surveillance.56 The
protest in Brasov did not spread in any meaningful sense to other areas of the country however.
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In both 1977 and 1987. the movements suffered from the inability to reach across group lines
and bring in others to mobilize in a sustained effort.57
Finally, there were some efforts within various churches but they were largely individual
clergy members. Within the Romanian Orthodox Church, the most well-known dissident was
Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa who spoke out against the atheism of the regime in his
famous seven words to the youth sermon of 1978.58 Father Calciu-Dumitreasa was arrested on
several occasions, spending approximately 21 years in prison before he was finally exiled from
Romania.59 There were some followers of his that continued within the Romanian Orthodox
Church but the opposition was never widespread.60 There was also some limited dissent within
the Baptist community as well.61 The inability to mobilize consistent opposition in Romania was
by design. The one area of society that was most difficult for Ceausescu to control was the
church and it remained one of the few areas of society not fully integrated into the Romanian
state.62
In examining the events in Timisoara during December 1989 specifically, there is some
evidence that the nature of the church community facilitated mobilization. In other words, “…the
prior group coherence provided by religious institutions was of critical importance.”63 The
element of group cohesion is especially important in the atomistic society created by Ceausescu.
In such an environment with limited formal opposition groups, spontaneous protest was the only
method available to generate widespread opposition movements. On December 15, when Tökes
was scheduled to be evicted, a very small group of around 40 parishioners showed up to form a
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human chain outside the residence.64 During his time in Timisoara, Tökes had increased the
number of events outside of official church services and had built a sense of community within
the church.65 The initial group of 40 quickly spread into the hundreds. The lack of concerted
effort to remove the protestors is one factor in the growth of the crowd.66 The crowd also grew
because of the network between the other minority churches, both in terms of religion and
ethnicity, in Timisoara. A member of Tökes’ congregation informed others in the Baptist and
Pentecostal churches of the potential eviction and people from these congregations joined the
protest.67 As the protest continued for the next few days, the crowds grew and included people
from all aspects of society.68 Even after the regime countered the protest with violence, the
crowds grew and the protest spread to other areas in Romania.
The social coherence within the Hungarian Reformed Church allowed for spontaneous
mobilization in defense of its pastor. The connections between the Hungarian Reformed Church
and other churches in Timisoara allowed for an initial expansion of the protest. This expanded
protest then precipitated the revolutionary bandwagon through lowering reputation costs, and
thus thresholds for others in society to express their private preferences. Tismaneanu, referring to
Ceausescu’s promise on December 20 to fire on other demonstrators, writes “that was perhaps
the magic moment when, in the consciousness of many Romanians, the threshold of fear was
crossed: Revulsion, moral indignation, outrage, and contempt suddenly became stronger than
fear.”69
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Magnifying Conditions
Two conditions were presented that would magnify the impact of religion. The first is if
the group had connections to other groups outside of the country. This condition holds in the
Romanian case. The logic suggests that groups from outside the country lower reputation costs
and create a safer environment for individuals to express their private preferences. The likelihood
of a movement emerging from the Romanian Orthodox Church was hindered, in part, because of
its lack of support from outside of Romania.70 The Hungarian Reformed Church, however, did
have connections outside of Romania. This was true in terms of ethnic Hungarians leaving
Romania and seeking refuge in Hungary and the role of ecumenical organizations in offering
support for Tökes.71 Importantly, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the World
Council of Churches echoed Tökes’ concern about the systematization program, sending public
protests directly to Ceausescu.72 The support of groups outside the country provided strength and
increased attention to the human rights violations within Romania.
The second condition concerns ties the religious community has with other groups in
society. This condition seems to be less of a factor in the Romanian case. There were increased
ties between Tökes’ church and other churches in Timisoara, as described above. There is little
evidence, however, of ties between the church and other groups in society, such as labor unions
or intellectual groups. The lack of extensive social ties is not surprising given the context of civil
society in Romania. Indeed, the social coherence within the church itself is so important to the
initial mobilization of protest in this case because of the lack of other organized groups within
society. The uprising spread not through existing social networks but through a lowering of
threshold levels across society and a widespread dissatisfaction with the government.
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Conclusion
There are many factors that led to the collapse of the Ceausescu regime in December
1989. The economic conditions within the country and the fall of similar governments
throughout Eastern Europe certainly increased the likelihood of some type of opposition
movement within Romania. But the task of mobilizing support remained extremely difficult in
the very atomized and repressive society. It is here where the influence of religion may become
part of the explanation. Individuals need to reach the point where they express their private
preferences, despite the potential reputation costs. The social coherence within the church in
Timisoara allowed for initial and spontaneous mobilization to emerge in support of their pastor.
As the protest grew, the reputation costs associated with opposition decreased due to the number
of people openly expressing their preferences. Perhaps the trust associated with religious
communities and leaders also led to an increase in perceptions of shared opposition.
The analysis presented here is in no way intended to confirm the theory presented.
The case offers a good opportunity to explore the theory presented and hopefully provide some
insights to revise the theory and expand it to other cases. The specific study presented would
benefit immensely by better data, especially as it relates to the issue of trust in religious groups
and leaders. Survey data prior to December 1989 or interviews of participants in the events of
December 1989 would provide a more accurate picture of levels of trust. Furthermore, the
concept of trust as presented here requires further refinement and better operationalization within
particular settings.
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the study is not to suggest that religion is a primary
factor in revolutions. The main concern is to attempt to systematize the influence of religion. The
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influence of religion is either forgotten completely or considered in an informal manner. The
influence of its social capital potential along with its established place in society seems to be
especially important in societies lacking networks of mobilization.
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